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MANDATORY ULTRASOUND STATUTES AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, SHIFTING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE.
CHERI D. SMITH
The jurisprudence of abortion law is replete with instances in which the
concerns of the woman seeking the procedure have taken a back seat. The newest
battleground in abortion regulation involves mandatory ultrasound statutes touted
as informed consent regulations. The analysis of courts confronting these statutes
has turned on whether the mandatory disclosures violate the physician’s First
Amendment right to be free from compelled speech. The particular breed of statute
at issue in this paper requires a physician not only to perform an ultrasound, but
also to make the images visible to the woman, to make audible the heartbeat, and to
provide a simultaneous description of the images that highlights certain features of
the fetus. Four states have enacted these speech and display mandatory ultrasound
requirements, namely Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma. I argue
that the woman’s right not to speak and to be free from unwanted speech are both
implicated by this form of mandatory ultrasound statute, and as such, require a
strict scrutiny analysis. Her body is being used as a platform for the state’s
message, and it is an essential component in the production of the compelled
speech. Applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the types of mandatory ultrasound
laws at issue in cases in both the Fifth and Fourth Circuits, I conclude that the
speech and display requirements do not satisfy the state’s compelling interest in
protecting fetal life post-viability and promoting maternal health, nor are they
narrowly tailored to achieve the legislation’s stated purpose.

INTRODUCTION
Heather Kay1 was elated to be pregnant with her first child. Eager to see how
the baby was progressing and to determine the sex, she and her husband received a
routine twenty-week ultrasound. Instead of learning whether they would be
welcoming a he or a she into the world, Heather heard the words that no expectant
B.A. International Studies Summa cum laude, 2007, Baylor University; J.D. Candidate, May 2014,
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to Heather Kay are taken from The Honorable Paul Stam,
J.D., Woman’s Right to Know Act: A Legislative History, 28 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 41 (2012) [hereinafter
Stam, WRKA Legislative History].
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parent wants to hear: the fetus had a severe brain abnormality described as
“devastating and incompatible with life.” After careful consideration, Heather and
her husband decided to abort the pregnancy rather than let the child be born only to
die a painful death in Heather’s arms. For Heather, although heart wrenching, the
process of securing an abortion was a dignified exchange between herself and her
physician.
Carolyn Jones2 received similar devastating news when she went in for a
routine ultrasound. It was then the doctor told her that her much anticipated son
was severely deformed, and that if he survived until birth, he would live a life of
constant pain. Carolyn also chose to terminate the pregnancy instead of choosing a
short and agonizing life for her child. The difference between Carolyn and Heather
is that Carolyn lives in Texas, where the state recently passed the Texas Women’s
Right to Know Act (“H.B. 15”).3 Unlike Heather, in order to receive an abortion,
Carolyn had to receive an ultrasound twenty-four hours before the procedure. The
new Texas law required that the physician display the sonogram, make audible the
heartbeat, and describe the images to her.4 On the same day that Carolyn learned
her baby was going to die, she also learned that her son had a well-developed
diaphragm, four functioning chambers of the heart, arms, legs, fingers, and toes. 5
Heather told her story to North Carolina House Judiciary Subcommittee in
hopes that hearing it would dissuade lawmakers from passing House Bill 854, a bill
that contained nearly identical provisions to the Texas law. Nevertheless, the North
Carolina Women’s Right to Know Act (“H.B. 854”) passed in October of 2011
with widespread support from lawmakers. 6
On December 19, 2011, a judge for the District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina granted a preliminary injunction on the H.B. 854 provisions
requiring a woman seeking an abortion to receive an ultrasound in advance of the
abortion procedure.7 While statutes requiring ultrasounds for abortions are fairly
common,8 the North Carolina statute also required the physician to display the live
ultrasound to the woman, and provide a detailed, simultaneous description of the

2 Unless otherwise noted, all references to Carolyn Jones are taken from Carolyn Jones, ‘We Have
No Choice’: One Woman’s Ordeal with Texas’ New Sonogram Law, TEXAS OBSERVER (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.texasobserver.org/we-have-no-choice-one-womans-ordeal-with-texas-new-sonogram-law/.
3 The Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West
2012).
4 See id.
5 Although the Texas Women’s Right to Know Act has since been clarified to not require women
in Carolyn’s situation to hear the verbal explanation or heartbeat, she still must receive the ultrasound.
The North Carolina Women’s Right to Know Act includes no such exceptions, so if Heather’s situation
occurred today, she would go through exactly what Carolyn went through.
6 The North Carolina Woman’s Right to Know Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (West
2011) (validity called into doubt by Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 2011)).
7 See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F.Supp.2d 424, 427 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
8 See Danielle Muoio, Coalition Fights North Carolina Abortion Law, THE CHRONICLE (Dec. 9,
2012), http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2012/12/10/coalition-fights-north-carolina-abortion-law.
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images.9 The district court granted the preliminary injunction on the grounds that
the “speech-and-display requirements violate[d] the First Amendment by
compelling unwilling speakers to deliver the state’s message discouraging
abortion.”10 On January 17 2014, the district court issued a final ruling on the
merits; affirming the rationale of the preliminary injunction and finding that the
physicians’ First Amendment rights were violated. 11
Also in 2011, the District Court for the Western District of Texas had reached
the same conclusion with regard to its nearly identical mandatory ultrasound
statute.12 However, on appeal, a unanimous Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
the district court’s ruling and found that under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,13 the state’s authority to regulate the medical profession
surpassed the compelled speech concerns of the physician. 14
I will argue that both the Fifth Circuit and the District Court for North
Carolina erroneously ignored the compelled speech concerns of the woman who is
the subject of the ultrasound. The state is using the woman’s body as a platform for
the state’s message, and the woman’s body is an essential component in the
production of the compelled speech. Therefore, any mandatory ultrasound statute
that requires the results to be displayed and described to a woman seeking an
abortion implicates her First Amendment15 rights. As the plaintiffs in Texas
Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey I and II noted, “[w]hat
makes the Act different is that it requires physicians, using information obtained
from women’s own bodies, to be the mouthpiece for the State’s views and requires
that women listen to those views.” 16 With this in mind, I argue that the
infringement on a woman’s First Amendment right requires a strict scrutiny
analysis. Even if Casey carved out an exception for regulating medical speech
when it comes to abortions, that exception narrowly applied to medical providers
and not to the women seeking the abortion.
The woman’s right to not know if she so chooses is also implicated. The
Supreme Court addressed the rights of an unwilling listener in the case of Hill v.
Colorado, and noted that the “right to be let alone [is one of] the most

9

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (West 2011).
See Stuart, 834 F.Supp.2d at 428 (adopting the reasoning of the plaintiffs that H.B. 854 was
subject to strict scrutiny on First Amendment grounds because it compelled the physician’s speech and
granted a preliminary injunction because the district court found that North Carolina had failed to
articulate a legitimate compelling interest to overcome the strict scrutiny standard).
11 See generally Stuart v. Loomis, 2014 WL 186310 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2014).
12 See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey I), 806 F. Supp. 2d 942,
958-59 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
13 See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14 See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey II), 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th
Cir. 2012).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16 Brief for Appellee at 21, Tex. Medical Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570 (2011)(No. 11-50814).
10
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comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” 17 In addition
to the compelled speech argument, I also argue that as a captive audience and an
unwilling listener, the First Amendment also protects the woman from having the
state’s message forced upon her as a requisite for receiving an abortion.
I. HISTORY OF MANDATORY ULTRASOUND STATUTES
A. Abortion Regulation and Informed Consent
The right of a woman to receive an abortion was first established in the case
of Roe v. Wade,18 in which the Court held that the woman’s right to choose was
part of her right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.19 The right was not absolute, but “at some point, state interests as to
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant.” 20 At
the outset, Roe identified the inherent struggle between the woman’s right to
privacy and the state’s compelling interest in protecting life. 21 The interests of the
attending physician were also given great care by the Roe decision. Prior to the
point where the state’s interest in potential life becomes compelling, “the attending
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation
by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be
terminated[; i]f that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an
abortion free of interference by the State.” 22
Informed consent laws in the abortion context trace their legacy back to the
Supreme Court’s rulings in the seminal cases of Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart.23
At issue in Casey were several state-imposed restrictions on abortion, including a
Pennsylvania abortion statute that required a physician performing an abortion to
complete the following:
[A]t least 24 hours before performing an abortion [the] physician [must]
inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the
abortion and of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn
child’[,] . . . the availability of printed materials published by the State
describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for
childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of

17 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
20 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)).
21 Id. at 155-56.
22 Id. at 163.
23 Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to
abortion.24

The Court determined the preceding informed consent requirements “may be
permissible” so long as “the information the State requires to be made available to
the woman is truthful and not misleading.” 25 In regard to the compelled speech
concerns of the physicians, the Court held that, “the physician’s First Amendment
rights not to speak are implicated . . . but only as part of the practice of medicine,
subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the state . . . [and w]e see no
constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the
information.”26 Specifically, the Court found that “[w]hatever constitutional status
the doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it is
derivative of the woman’s position.”27 The Court then determined that the
informed consent provisions did not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment
because there was no evidence in the record that they placed an undue burden on a
woman’s ability to receive an abortion.28
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court again reaffirmed the undue burden
analysis of Casey in the case of Gonzales v. Carhart, where the Court analyzed the
constitutionality of the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban. 29 Where the Casey
ruling articulated the state interests as the protection of the health of the mother and
the potential life within her, the Carhart Court added that the state also has an
interest in promoting medical ethics in regard to abortion practices. 30 Carhart also
expanded the scope of the state’s interest in informed consent to encompass the
“lack of information concerning the way in which the fetus will be killed.” 31
Post-Casey, several state legislatures began to pass various informed consent
requirements, typically mandating the dissemination of information regarding the
risks of abortion, statistics about fetal development, and the alternatives to
abortion.32 Generally, these laws have survived constitutional challenges due to
24

Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
Id. at 882.
26 Id. at 884 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977))
27 Id.
28 The undue burden analysis is unique to abortion litigation and requires the court to determine
whether the regulation places a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before
fetal viability; if yes, then the regulation indeed places an undue burden and will be found to be an
unconstitutional intrusion on the woman’s right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Casey,
505 U.S. at 884.
29 See generally Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
30 See id. at 157; see also Robert M. Godzeno, Note, The Role of Ultrasound Imaging in Informed
Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 285, 296 (2009).
31 Although noting that there was no evidence before the Court, the Court nevertheless found that
“it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life
they once created and sustained . . . . The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well
informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with
grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once
did not know: [how the fetus died]. . .” Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159-60.
32 See Muoio, supra note 8.
25
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courts’ determinations that the information required by the state was truthful,
relevant, and not misleading. For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently upheld mandatory disclosures of an increased risk of suicide in women
who undergo abortion procedures. 33 The court held that:
[W]hile the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the State’s
ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a
physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a
patient’s decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.34

B. An Overview of Mandatory Ultrasound Laws
The newest battleground over informed consent regulations involves
mandatory ultrasound statutes. An ultrasound, or sonogram, is a type of imaging
procedure that uses sound waves to produce an image of the fetus in utero.35 There
are two kinds of ultrasound procedures: transabdominal and transvaginal. 36 The
transabdominal procedure involves the familiar technique of moving a hand-held
probe across the woman’s abdomen. 37 Transvaginal ultrasounds are substantially
more invasive, and require the physician to insert a probe into the woman’s vagina.
Transvaginal ultrasounds are generally used before eight weeks gestational age due
to the fact that a transabdominal ultrasound does not produce a clear image of the
fetus or embryo at such an early stage in a pregnancy. 38
Generally, there are three kinds of mandatory ultrasound statutes. 39 The first
type of ultrasound law is the least invasive, and only requires that a physician
performing an abortion must provide the woman with the opportunity to receive an
ultrasound as part of the informed consent process for the procedure. 40 In this first
category, the woman is permitted to refuse. 41 The slightly more demanding second
category of ultrasound laws require a woman to receive an ultrasound regardless of
her opposition to the procedure, and the physician must present her with the option
to view the images.42 The third type of statute that is at issue in this paper requires
33

See Planned Parenthood Minn., N. D., S. D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012).
See id. at 893.
35 Pregnancy
Ultrasound,
MEDLINE
PLUS
(Feb.
21,
2010),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003778.htm.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.;
see also Transvaginal Ultrasound, MEDICINE PLUS (July 11, 2012),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003779.htm.
39 See Godzeno, supra note 29, at 304.
40 Id. (referencing ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-602(a) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3(4) (2006 &
Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-609(3) (2004 & Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(b)
(West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015(8) (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41330(A)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2007)).
41 See id.
42 See id. (referencing ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
390.012(3)(d)(4) (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(C) (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 4134
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a physician not only to perform an ultrasound, but also to make it visible to the
woman, make audible the heartbeat, and provide a simultaneous description of the
images highlighting certain features of the fetus. 43 Four states have enacted the
most invasive form of mandatory ultrasound requirements, namely Louisiana,
North Carolina,44 Texas,45 and Oklahoma.46 According to a brief released by the
Guttmacher Institute, thirty-five states currently require women to receive
counseling before an abortion, twenty-seven detail the type of information women
must be given, and twenty-six specify a time period that women must wait before
an abortion.47 The North Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma statutes combine all
three.48 Because a majority of abortions occur before eight weeks, women are
often subject to invasive transvaginal exams as a prerequisite for an abortion.49
The Oklahoma Statute, Senate Bill 1878, was struck down in state court on
state law grounds.50 In Nova Health Systems v. Pruitt, the District Court of
Oklahoma held that the requirement violated the Oklahoma Constitution because it
constituted an impermissible special law that singled out less than an entire class of
similarly situated persons for different treatment. 51 Federal district courts,
however, have focused on the potential First and Fourteenth Amendment
violations.
C. The Woman’s Right to Know Act and Lakey I & II.
The Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act 52 (“H.B. 15”) was originally passed
in 2003, and required that physicians distribute certain state-prepared informational
materials to women seeking abortions as part of the regulated practice of informed
medical consent.53 In 2011, the Act was substantially amended to include the

41-34(1) (West Supp. 2007)).
43 See id.
44 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (West 2012).
45 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2012).
46 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§1-738.1A, 1-738.3d, & 1-738.3e (West 2012).
47 See Muoio, supra note 8.
48 Id.
49 See Nicholas Kristof, When States Abuse Women, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/kristof-when-states-abuse-women.html?_r=0; see
also Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to A Protected Choice, 56
UCLA L. REV. 351, 391 (2008) (citing Maureen Paul et al., The Roles of Clinical Assessment, Human
Chorionic Gonadtropin Assays, and Ultrasonography in Medical Abortion Practice, 183 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S34, S36 (2000); Prabha Sinha et al., Value of Routine Transvaginal
Ultrasound Scan in Women Requesting Early Termination of Pregnancy, 24 J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOLOGY 426 (2004)).
50 See Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, No. 2:12-CV-00395, 2012 WL 1034022 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Okla.
Cnty. Mar. 28, 2012) (enjoining statute’s enforcement permanently).
51 Id. (citing OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59).
52 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2012).
53 REGULATION OF ABORTION; CREATING AN OFFENSE, 2003 TEX. SESS. LAW SERV. CH. 999 (H.B.
15) (West).
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controversial ultrasound requirements at issue in Lakey I & II.54 In March 2013,
two proposed amendments were introduced to the Texas State Legislature, one
repealing the mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period before an abortion,55 and
the other repealing the requirement that the physician who is to perform the
abortion warn the patient about an increased risk of breast cancer. 56 Neither of
these amendments affects the most contentious aspects of the legislation.
Specifically at issue in Lakey I & II were the compelled speech requirements
of sections 171.012(a)(4)(B), (C), and (D); and section 171.012(a)(5), which the
district court found unconstitutional.57 The sections at issue state the following:
171.012(a)(4)(B), (C), (D): (B) the physician who is to perform the
abortion displays the sonogram images in a quality consistent with current
medical practice in a manner that the pregnant woman may view them; (C)
the physician who is to perform the abortion provides, in a manner
understandable to a layperson, a verbal explanation of the results of the
sonogram images, including a medical description of the dimensions of the
embryo or fetus, the presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of
external members and internal organs; and (D) the physician who is to
perform the abortion or an agent of the physician who is also a sonographer
certified by a national registry of medical sonographers makes audible the
heart auscultation for the pregnant woman to hear, if present, in a quality
consistent with current medical practice and provides, in a manner
understandable to a layperson, a simultaneous verbal explanation of the
heart auscultation.58

The law provides for a handful of exceptions. First, a woman is exempt from the
ultrasound requirement if she is facing a medical emergency that places her “in
danger of death or a serious risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily
function unless an abortion is performed.”59 A woman may decline to hear the
verbal explanation of the ultrasound results only if she certifies that she was:
[P]regnan[t as] a result of a sexual assault, incest, or other violation of the
Penal Code that has been reported to law enforcement authorities or that
has not been reported because she] has a reason that she declines to reveal
because she reasonably believes that to do so would put her at risk of
retaliation resulting in serious bodily injury; or [she] is a minor and

54

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012.
H.R. 3744, 2013 Leg., 83d Cong. (Tex. 2013).
56 H.R. 2945, 2013 Leg., 83d Cong. (Tex. 2013).
57 See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey I), 806 F. Supp. 2d 942,
949 (W.D. Tex. 2011).
58 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (a)(4)(B -D).
59 Id. at § 171.0124 (allowing a physician to perform an abortion without getting informed consent
in the event of a “medical emergency”); id. at § 171.002(3) (defining “medical emergency”).
55
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obtaining an abortion in accordance with judicial bypass procedures. . . or
the fetus has an irreversible medical condition or abnormality. 60

1. Lakey I
After the law’s passage, a group of Texas abortion providers immediately
filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin the law, in part based on the argument
that the law “compel[led] physicians to engage in government-mandated speech . . .
[and] . . . requir[ed] patients to submit to such speech, regardless of whether it is
wanted or medically necessary” in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.61 In Lakey I, the District Court for the Western District of Texas
granted a preliminary injunction principally on the grounds that H.B. 15 violated
the First Amendment prohibition against compelled speech, and was subject to
strict scrutiny for three reasons.62 First, the district court noted that in Casey, the
Supreme Court addressed an informed consent requirement in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the First Amendment, and therefore the undue
burden test was appropriate in that limited context. 63 Second, the district court
highlighted that the Casey Court “stop[ped] short of characterizing [the
government’s interest in potential life] as ‘compelling’” until viability. 64 And
third, the district court found that Casey only went as far as to say that, “[i]f the
information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not
misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”65 Therefore, Casey approved of
making information available to women in some cases, and did not give the
government a “carte blanche” to “force physicians to deliver, and force women to
consider, whatever information the government deems appropriate.”66
The district court briefly addressed the unwilling listener constitutional
concerns of the woman undergoing the procedure, and determined that the plaintiffs
had not provided sufficient case law in support of their argument. 67 Although the
plaintiffs attempted to analogize the unwilling listener concerns of the woman to
those addressed by the Supreme Court in Hill v. Colorado, the district court found
Hill to be particularly distinguishable. 68
In Hill, the State of Colorado had enacted Colorado Rev. Stat. § 18–9–
122(3), which made it illegal for any person within one hundred feet of a health
60

Id. at § 171.0122(d); see also id. at 171.012(5).
Lakey I, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
62 Id. at 96970. Although the H.B. 15 was challenged on multiple Constitutional grounds, for the
purposes of this paper I focus only on the compelled speech and unwanted listener arguments pertaining
to the First Amendment analysis.
63 Id. at 972.
64 Id.
65 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
66 Id.
67 Lakey I, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 958-59.
68 Id. (referencing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–17 (2000)).
61
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care facility’s entrance to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person,
without that person’s consent, in order to pass “a leaflet or handbill to, displa[y] a
sign to, or engag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person.”69
The law was passed in response to widespread harassment of women by antiabortion protestors as the women entered or exited abortion clinics. 70
In considering Hill, the Lakey district court found that the right to be left
alone was not explicit, but applied narrowly to where the state imposed a restriction
on speech in order to protect a private citizen’s interest in being free from unwanted
speech.71 As such, the district court found that the right did not extend to situations
in which the state itself imposes a message on an unwilling and captive audience. 72
However, the court did not entirely foreclose the unwilling listener argument:
While the Court acknowledges the intuitive logic of Plaintiffs’ argument,
and there surely are limits to the government’s power to impose whatever
message it desires, on whomever it likes, under any circumstances it
desires, those limits seem fairly undefined, at least as applied to this case.
The most the Court can say is that Hill does not seem to support Plaintiffs’
argument. Because Plaintiffs have not provided any case law in support of
their argument, and the Court is not aware of any, it rejects Plaintiffs’
second argument.73

In reaching its conclusion, the only First Amendment concerns that weighed
on the district court’s decision were those pertaining to the compelled speech of the
physician.
2. Lakey II
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit summarily rejected the
district court’s analysis and upheld H.B. 15.74 Writing for the court, Chief Judge
Edith H. Jones distilled four “rules” from the combined holdings of Casey and
Carhart. First, an informed consent law is permissible so long as it requires
“truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures,” and does not impose an undue
burden on the woman seeking the abortion. 75 Second, informed consent laws are
not ideological speech when they are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of the
medical practice, and therefore they do not require a strict scrutiny analysis.76 In
coming to this conclusion, the court reasoned that the Casey plurality’s response to
69

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000).
Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper
Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 32 (2003).
71 Lakey I, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
72 Id. at 959.
73 Id.
74 Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey II), 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th
Cir. 2012).
75 Id. at 576.
76 See id.
70
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the compelled speech claim was not a strict scrutiny analysis, because it did not
inquire into compelling interests or narrow tailoring when analyzing the First
Amendment claims of the plaintiffs.77 Therefore, the “physicians’ rights not to
speak are, when part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing
and regulation by the State[, and t]his applies to information that is ‘truthful,’ ‘nonmisleading,’ and ‘relevant . . . to the decision to undergo an abortion.’” 78 Third,
informed consent in the abortion context not only encompasses disclosing the
physical and psychological risks associated with the procedure, but also provides
space for the state to express its profound interest in the life of the fetus. 79 The
Cicuit Court found that Carhart served to enhance Casey’s holding by “uph[olding]
a state’s ‘significant role . . . in regulating the medical profession, and add[ing] that
‘[t]he government may use its voice and regulatory authority to show its profound
respect for the life within the woman.’” 80 Lastly, informed consent laws are not
unconstitutional merely because they might have the effect of causing a woman to
choose childbirth over abortion.81
On the foregoing set of premises, the Fifth Circuit incorporated the undue
burden analysis from Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence into the First
Amendment analysis of the compelled speech claims of the plaintiff physicians.
From this perspective, the court compared the informed consent provisions in H.B.
15 to the printed materials at issue in Casey, and determined that “[t]hey are not
different in kind, although more graphic and scientifically up-to-date,” and
therefore fall within the category of “information about fetal development [that] is
‘relevant’ to a woman’s decision-making.”82 H.B. 15 was thus upheld, and went
into effect in May of 2013.
D. The Woman’s Right to Know Act and Stuart v. Huff, Stuart v. Loomis
Passed in 2011 over the objection of the Governor of North Carolina, the
North Carolina Women’s Right to Know Act (“H.B. 854”) had a speech and
display requirement almost identical to H.B. 15.83 According to the North Carolina
legislature, informed consent requires that at least four hours before a woman is to
receive an abortion, either the physician performing the abortion or a qualified
technician:
(1) Perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn child on the pregnant
woman. (2) Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display is

77 Id. at 575 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882
(1992)).
78 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 882).
79 Id.
80 Lakey II, 667 F.3d at 576, (quoting Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007)).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 578.
83 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (West 2012).
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depicting, which shall include the presence, location, and dimensions of the
unborn child within the uterus and the number of unborn children depicted.
The individual performing the display shall offer the pregnant woman the
opportunity to hear the fetal heart tone. The image and auscultation of fetal
heart tone shall be of a quality consistent with the standard medical
practice in the community. If the image indicates that fetal demise has
occurred, a woman shall be informed of that fact. (3) Display the images
so that the pregnant woman may view them. (4) Provide a medical
description of the images, which shall include the dimensions of the
embryo or fetus and the presence of external members and internal organs,
if present and viewable. (5) Obtain a written certification from the woman,
before the abortion, that the requirements of this section have been
complied with, which shall indicate whether or not she availed herself of
the opportunity to view the image.84

Originally introduced in 1981, the initial proposed legislation would have required
a physician performing an abortion to provide the woman with information about
adoption services and the complications and risks of an abortion procedure. 85
Although the bill passed the North Carolina Senate, it was not considered by the
House.86 Again in 1989, the restyled Abortion Control Act, H.B. 1231 (N.C.
1989), included similar provisions that mandated physicians performing abortions
to make the woman aware of the associated risks and alternatives. 87 The bill did
not make it out of committee, and over the next decade it was amended and
reintroduced until the Women’s Right to Know Act finally earned a Committee
hearing and was subsequently passed in 2011.88
After the passage of the law, North Carolina medical providers filed suit in
federal court on behalf of themselves and their patients seeking abortions,
challenging the constitutionality of the law under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.89 Like the plaintiffs in Lakey I & II, the North Carolina plaintiffs in
the case of Stuart v. Huff also contended that the speech and display requirements
“violate the First Amendment by compelling unwilling speakers to deliver the
state’s message discouraging abortion.”90
In December of 2011, North Carolina District Court Judge Catherine C.
Eagles granted the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the
speech and display requirements of H.B. 854. The court found that the speech and
display requirements “are subject to strict scrutiny under traditional and
84

Id. at (1)-(5).
See Stam, supra note 1, at 9.
86 Id. at 10.
87 Id. at 10-11.
88 Id. at 11.
89 See generally Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011); Again, for the purposes of
this paper I focus only on the compelled speech Constitutional challenges raised in this case and brought
under the First Amendment.
90 Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 428.
85
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longstanding First Amendment principles,” and that the law did not satisfy a
compelling state interest, nor was it narrowly tailored.91
In determining whether to apply a strict scrutiny analysis, the court reasoned
that Casey did not purport to overrule longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence
but rather applied the undue burden analysis to the informed consent provisions in
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the First. 92 Where the Fifth
Circuit found that the three sentences in which Casey dismissed the plaintiff’s First
Amendment argument was the “antithesis” of strict scrutiny, the District Court of
North Carolina held that “[t]he Supreme Court’s brief discussion of the First
Amendment challenges to the Pennsylvania statute was undertaken separately and
without substantial detail[; i]t seems unlikely that the Supreme Court decided by
implication that long-established First Amendment law was irrelevant when speech
about abortion is at issue.”93
The district court opened the compelled speech analysis by asserting that the
right to be free from engaging in government mandated speech is a tenet of First
Amendment jurisprudence.94 Further, the court noted the historically dim view
taken by the Supreme Court of content-based compelled speech, and reasoned that
any such imposition by the government must satisfy strict scrutiny. 95
In December of 2012, the district court enjoined the real time speech and
display requirements of the law, and a year later the case was decided on the merits.
In Stuart v. Loomis the court found that H.B. 854’s mandated disclosure went
beyond the bounds of Casey by “requir[ing] the provider to deliver in his or her
own voice information the state deems relevant during the middle of a medical
procedure in the exact manner dictated by the state, a much more significant
intrusion.”96
Six months after the first Stuart decision, in an unrelated case, the Fourth
Circuit held that when it comes to mandatory disclosures in abortion regulation,
Casey requires intermediate level scrutiny.97 The court noted that specifically,
Casey dealt with “mandatory disclosures focused on the speech of licensed medical
professionals. . . [and] the regulation of such professional speech was imposed
incidental to the broader governmental regulation of a profession and was justified
91

Id. at 432.
See id. at 430.
93 Id. at 430.
94 See id. at 428 (citing Hurley v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 573 (1995)).
95 Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (finding that the state could not compel students to pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag; also citing
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 715 (1977) (determining that New Hampshire could not force
citizens to display the state’s ideological message on their vehicle license plates)).
96 Loomis, 2014 WL 186310 at *12.
97 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 683 F.3d 539,
554 (4th Cir. 2012) reh’g en banc granted, 11-1111 L, 2012 WL 7855859 (4th Cir. Aug. 15, 2012)
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
92
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by this larger context.”98 If Stuart moves up to the Court of Appeals under the
current precedent established by Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, H.B. 854 will likely be
evaluated under an intermediate scrutiny standard with regard to the compelled
speech of the physician.99
III. UNDUE BURDEN, STRICT SCRUTINY, AND SCHOLARLY DEBATE
Before 2011, a number of scholars and legal analysts wrote a great deal on
whether mandatory ultrasound laws would survive as the natural progression of
informed consent under the undue burden analysis and the Fourteenth
Amendment.100 Surprisingly, the Texas and North Carolina District Courts, as
well as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, all analyzed the legitimacy of the
mandatory ultrasound laws under the First Amendment from the perspective of the
physician’s compelled speech claims. The underlying dispute between the courts is
whether to apply an undue burden test or a traditional strict scrutiny analysis to
compelled speech in the abortion context. Scholars have generally attempted to
analyze mandatory abortion regulations from two perspectives: (1) the physician’s
in regard to a first amendment challenge, or (2) the woman’s under a Fourteenth
Amendment undue burden analysis.
A. Compelled speech and the First Amendment—the Physician’s Perspective
Scott Gaylord, current law professor at Elon University School of Law,
recently coauthored a law review article arguing that the “speech and display”
requirements of mandatory ultrasound regulations that implicate the First
Amendment should be subject to an undue burden rather than strict scrutiny
analysis.101 Gaylord proffers that Casey explicitly rejected a strict scrutiny
analysis because the plurality failed to consider the state’s compelling interests and
narrow tailoring of the statute at issue.102 Instead, the Casey Court looked to
whether the informed consent provision placed a substantial obstacle in the path of
98

Id. at 554.
On rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court improperly granted
summary judgment when it concluded that the speech at issue was not commercial in nature. Instead,
the court found that a city ordinance requiring crisis pregnancy centers to post signs notifying potential
clients that they did not provide abortion services could target commercial speech and subject only to
rational basis review, however more discovery was needed on this point. The court did not engage in
any discussion of whether Casey requires strict or intermediate scrutiny for the compelled speech
concerns of the physician, who is required to disclose a state mandated message to a patient. See
Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 283
(4th Cir. 2013).
100 See generally Godenzo, supra note 30, at 323; see also Kaitlin Moredock, Ensuring So Grave A
Choice Is Well Informed: The Use of Abortion Informed Consent Laws to Promote State Interests in
Unborn Life, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1973, 1990 (2010).
101 Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and A Woman’s Right to Know: Ultrasounds,
Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 595, 619 (2012).
102 See id. at 619-20.
99
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the woman seeking an abortion.103 Additionally, Gaylord argues “in citing Wooley
and Whalen, Casey expressly adopted a lower standard for compelled disclosures in
the medical context, including disclosures relating to abortion.” 104 The connection
to Whalen v. Roe highlights the argument that when it comes to medical
disclosures, the courts have traditionally refused to apply a strict scrutiny analysis.
Whalen involved a New York statute that required physicians to disclose certain
information about patients who had schedule II drug prescriptions. 105 Although the
State was requiring the physician to disclose information they otherwise would not
have, the Court’s decision failed to address any potential compelled speech
concerns pertaining to the physicians, turning rather on whether the mandatory
disclosures violated the privacy rights of the patients. 106 Gaylord asserts that
Wooley stands for “a lower standard for compelled disclosures in the medical
context” that Casey then extended to abortion procedures.107
To conclude otherwise would cut against the Court’s decision in Casey, and
yet this is exactly what the Texas and North Carolina district courts did, albeit in
different ways.108 In Lakey I, Gaylord argues that the district court overlooked the
underlying theme of Casey by narrowly distinguishing the cases based on the facts,
noting that the informed consent provisions in Casey were limited to medically
relevant information.109 Gaylord further asserts that Stuart inaccurately presumed
Casey applied strict scrutiny to the First Amendment concerns of the physicians,
even though the Stuart court simultaneously admitted that Casey identified no
compelling interest of the state.110
Because Casey specifically articulated that the state’s interest is not
compelling until after viability, Gaylord contends that by approving informed
consent provisions that applied to all stages of pregnancy, the Court affirmatively
rejected a strict scrutiny analysis.111 After all, if Casey had applied strict scrutiny
to the pre-viability informed consent provisions, the Court would have found them
unconstitutional for lack of a compelling state interest.112 Additionally, Casey
specifically noted that the physicians’ rights were derivative of the woman’s rights

103

See id. at 619 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).
Id. at 620 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (establishing that the First
Amendment also protects the right not to speak); also citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977)
(finding that a statute requiring mandatory disclosure of some patient information to state health
employees did not infringe on the patient’s right to privacy, nor did it inhibit the practice of medicine,
but was simply a necessary part of health care regulation)).
105 See Whalen, 429 U.S. 589 at 591.
106 See id. at 607.
107 Gaylord & Molony, supra note 101, at 620 (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715).
108 Id. at 620-621.
109 Id. at 621 (citing Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey I), 806 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 974 (W.D. Tex. 2011)).
110 Id. (citing Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (M.D.N.C. 2011)).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 624 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871, 877-78 (1992))..
104
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in a doctor-patient relationship.113 If a court were to apply both strict scrutiny and
undue burden analysis to the same informed consent provisions, it would yield
inconsistent results and is therefore unworkable as a legal standard in the abortion
context.114
Sarah Runels, writing for the Journal of Contemporary Law and Policy,
adopts a different view. She identifies three issues stemming from Casey that
support a finding that mandatory informed consent provisions violate the
physician’s First Amendment protection against compelled speech.115 First,
although professional speech is subject to a lower level of constitutional protection,
when physician’s speech is not related to the practice of medicine, it is entitled to
the fuller protection of the First Amendment because it falls outside the realm of
professional speech.116 Secondly, Casey provided no guidance on how to reconcile
whether a regulation could satisfy a compelling interest while simultaneously
presenting an unreasonable infringement of physician’s speech.117 Third, by not
addressing what precisely constitutes a reasonable regulation of physician speech in
relation to informed consent, Casey failed to adequately analyze the clash between
the physician’s First Amendment rights and the state’s ability to regulate the
medical profession.118
Runels and others119 have argued that the courts must determine whether
mandated speech falls under the category of professional speech, and therefore
subject to a lower level of scrutiny, or whether it falls outside medical speech and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 120 In essence, this would require the courts to
delve into whether the state mandated abortion disclosures were medically relevant
to informed consent, and if not, then the physician’s compelled speech is not
professional because it does not pertain to the practice of medicine. 121
Despite scholarly analysis of the topic,122 it remains unclear whether the
Court intended to allow states a wide berth to impose mandatory abortion
113

See Gaylord & Malony, supra note 101, at 624.
Id. at 630.
115 See Sarah Runels, Informed Consent Laws and the Constitution: Balancing State Interests with A
Physician’s First Amendment Rights and A Woman’s Due Process Rights, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 185, 197 (2009).
116 See id. (citing Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 (2007) (analyzing compelled physician speech
in informed consent provisions)).
117 Id.
118 See id.
119 See generally Post, supra note 116.
120 Runels, supra note 115, at 198.
121 Post, supra note 116, at 940.
122 See generally Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws
Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2 (2012) (arguing that mandatory
abortion disclosures require physicians to present patients with medically irrelevant information in an
thinly veiled effort to present the state’s moral message about abortion, thus violating medical ethical
standards); see also Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds As the
Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 360 (2009) (arguing that state
114
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disclosures as part of the legitimate regulation of the medical profession, or
whether limitations exist when the disclosures exceed the realm of medically
relevant information.
B. Undue burden analysis and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Generally, under an undue burden analysis, states are prohibited from placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the stage
of fetal viability. Although seeking to clarify the Court’s position in Roe by
rejecting a strict scrutiny, rigid trimester framework, some have argued that Casey
did little to address the exact parameters of the undue burden analysis and that
appellate courts have applied the standard in a manner that inadequately protects
the right to an abortion.123 Specifically, by neglecting to include a nexus element
like those included in other constitutional standards of review, 124 Casey has been
misapplied, “render[ing] the undue burden standard insufficient to protect women’s
reproductive autonomy.”125
Emma Freeman126 argues that Casey intended the undue burden analysis to
be on par with intermediate scrutiny.127 Although the Court couched the undue
burden analysis in the familiar terms of rational basis review, speaking of the
legitimate aim of the state and the reasonable measures taken to meet those aims,
the Court still struck down the spousal notification provision as exceeding the
state’s legitimate aim.128 Freeman argues that this implied nexus analysis belies
Casey’s original intent to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny when considering
an undue burden analysis.129 The undue burden standard is therefore a two-step
process, whereby the court first determines whether the state has a legitimate
interest that is rationally connected to the legislation, and second, whether the
legislation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion pre-viability.130

mandated abortion disclosures cut against the purported state aim of promoting the psychological well
being of the woman, and also violate her right to refuse medical treatment).
123 See Emma Freeman, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review in Undue
Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2013).
124 See id. at 282-84. Rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny all require a
nexus between the government legislation and a legitimate governmental aim. The undue burden
analysis looks to whether a substantial obstacle has been placed in the path of the woman seeking an
abortion and does not overly inquire into the nexus between the imposed regulation and the
government’s legitimate aim.
125 Id.
126 Emma Freeman was named one of the twenty “most impressive” students at Harvard Law by
Business Insider in a 2013 article. See Max Rosenburg, 20 Incredibly Impressive Students at Harvard
Law School Right Now, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/mostimpressive-harvard-law-students-2013-3?op=1.
127 Freeman, supra note 122, at 295–96, 282-284.
128 Id. at 293-94 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883, 885 (1992)).
129 See id. at 294 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 898).
130 Freeman, supra note 122, at 295–96, 301.
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Applying this test to H.B. 15, Freeman argues that the Texas legislation fails
to meet the state’s articulated legitimate ends on two fronts. 131 First, the “opt out”
provisions of the law whereby a woman can refuse to view the ultrasound or hear
the heartbeat essentially thwart the state’s articulated goal of providing women with
complete knowledge of the abortion procedure.132 Instead, H.B. 15 is well-tailored
for an improper purpose, namely “to shame women for exercising the abortion right
or make abortions more difficult to procure.” 133 An improper purpose would thus
render H.B. 15 invalid under an undue burden analysis, since the state’s aim is for
the legislation to become a substantial obstacle.134 Without first analyzing the
nexus between the regulation and the stated goal, it is unlikely that a court would
strike down legislation such as H.B. 15 on a substantial obstacle analysis alone.
Therefore, the nexus analysis is necessary to determine the purpose of the
regulation.135
Similarly, Professor Jeffrey Van Detta also laments the failing of Casey to
articulate the standard of judicial review in regard to the undue burden analysis. 136
Van Detta argues that the state has a “concomitant governmental interest (or duty)
in protecting a woman’s rights of choice and of reproductive autonomy,” that also
must be considered in undue burden jurisprudence.137 On this ground, a showing
that the motivation behind the legislation was to interfere with the woman’s
freedom of reproductive choice would invalidate the statute as unconstitutional
discrimination against women in the exercise of that right.138 Against this
backdrop, an undue burden analysis must be wary of pre-textual claims of a
legitimate interest in health or life when analyzing informed consent regulations
that “morally Mirandize” women seeking an abortion.139 If the purpose or effect of
the informed consent provision is to coerce women into childbirth, then the
regulation cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. 140
When it comes to informed consent provisions, it remains unclear whether
the Court will step in and elaborate on the undue burden standard, and whether
mandatory abortion disclosures that remove a woman’s choice to refuse the

131

See id.
See id. at 310 (citing Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey II), 667
F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012).
133 Id. at 311.
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative Due-Process
Anti-Discrimination Principle That Gives Constitutional Content to the “Undue Burden” Standard of
Review Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 211, 215
(2001).
137 Id. at 216.
138 See id.
139 Id. at 259.
140 See id.
132
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information constitute a substantial obstacle due to the state’s purpose to limit
abortions.
III. SHIFTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The jurisprudence of abortion is replete with instances where the concerns of
the woman seeking the procedure have taken a back seat. 141 A woman seeking an
abortion is a “passive object, . . . [a] battleground on which the state and the
physician stake out their interests.”142 In Roe, the Court noted that “the abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic
responsibility for it must rest with the physician.”143 The Court later modified
Roe’s holding in Casey to emphasize the state’s interest in protecting potential life,
while simultaneously casting doubt on a woman’s ability to make a thoughtful and
coherent decision about terminating her pregnancy. 144 Against this backdrop, it is
not surprising that the legal analysis emanating from the courts surrounding the
constitutional validity of mandatory ultrasound statutes has turned on the
compelled speech concerns of the physician and failed to recognize the implicit
First Amendment concerns of the woman seeking an abortion. Even less surprising
is how legitimate Fourteenth Amendment undue burden challenges have become
overshadowed by the analysis of the physician’s rights.
I argue that the woman’s right not to speak, and to be free from unwanted
speech are both implicated by the mandatory ultrasound statutes, and as such,
require a strict scrutiny analysis. Applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the types of
mandatory ultrasound laws at issue in Lakey and Stuart, I conclude that the speech
and display requirements do not satisfy the state’s compelling interest in protecting
maternal life or fetal life post-viability, nor are they narrowly tailored to achieve the
legislation’s stated purpose.
A. First Amendment Concerns of Women Seeking Abortions
The protection of freedom of speech is a fundamental tenet of the U.S.
Constitution. The First Amendment notably states that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 145 The right to freedom of speech is not
absolute, but subject to reasonable limitation by the state if the state regulation
141 Paula Abrams, The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme Court and the Language of Abortion Stigma, 19
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 293, 294 (2013).
142 Id. (citing Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications of
a Shirting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 47-8 (2008)).
143 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973); see also Calautti v, Franklin, 49 U.S. 379, 387 (1979)
(“Roe stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the woman about
whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried out.”)
144 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (“In attempting to ensure that
a woman apprehend [sic] the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose
of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed.”)
145 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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survives strict scrutiny.146 The Court has interpreted freedom of speech to include
both verbal and non-verbal communication.147 Additionally, the Court has
interpreted the First Amendment to include the freedom not to speak when one
chooses to remain silent.148
A woman seeking an abortion who is subject to one of the mandatory
ultrasound statutes faces two potential First Amendment violations: (1) her body is
being used as the medium to create the state’s ideological message, and (2) she is
being forced to hear information that she would otherwise refuse to hear. Both
concerns sound in First Amendment protections and require a strict scrutiny
analysis.
1. Compelled Speech, the Woman’s Body as a Platform for the States’ Message
The mandatory ultrasound display and disclosure statutes fundamentally
differ from any prior informed consent statutes that the court has dealt with by
requiring complicity from the woman in the production of the state message. There
is no way to extricate the role that the woman plays in the ultrasound procedure.
She is required by the state to allow her body to be used to produce an image that is
then interpreted in carefully crafted terms to convey the state’s message. To put it
bluntly, “the image—a woman’s fetus—has been captured in her own gut and is
offered for the very purpose of persuading her to save its life. . . there is a
difference between the state providing information about the fetus in general and
requiring a woman to produce an image of her own fetus.”149 In requiring a
woman to submit her body to assist in the production of the state’s message, the
state intimately violates her First Amendment right against compelled speech.
a. Protection from Compelled Ideological Statements, and Compelled Statements
of Fact
A fundamental aspect of the First Amendment is the right to be free from
forced advertisement of the state’s ideological message. This concept was
articulated by the Court in Wooley v. Maynard, where a state law required New
146 There are a few exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny in regard to compelled speech.
The first arises when the government restricts or mandates certain commercial speech. Regulations
pertaining to commercial speech (speech that is proposing a commercial transaction) are only subject to
“a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values.” Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). Second, the government
may regulate broadcast network programming at a lower level of scrutiny due to the limited broadcast
spectrum that all providers are subject to, and the government’s interest in regulating frequency
assignments. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
147 See e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that displaying a motto on a license
place qualified as protected speech); see also W. Va. St. Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(finding that the act of saluting the flag constituted speech).
148 See generally Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (finding that
the First Amendment also protects the right to refrain from speaking).
149 Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to A Protected Choice,
56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 394, 401 (2008).

SMITH_FORMATTE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

MANDATORY ULTRASOUND STATUTES

5/1/2014 9:49 AM

875

Hampshire residents to display the state motto of “Live free, or Die,” on their stateissued license plates or face criminal sanctions. 150 The Court struck down the
requirement, and upheld the right of a private individual to be free from using his
private property as a “mobile billboard for the state’s ideological message.” 151 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court referenced the 1943 decision in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, where the Court held that a state could not
require students to participate in a compulsory salute to the flag as a requisite for
school attendance.152 Specifically, Barnette highlighted that by refusing to
participate in a ceremony, the plaintiffs were not infringing on the constitutional
rights of others.153 Rather, the “sole conflict is between [state] authority and rights
of the individual,” articulated as the “right of self-determination in matters that
touch individual opinion and personal attitude.” 154 When it comes to compelling
speech, the government is forbidden from requiring an individual to speak or
display the state’s ideological message if the individual objects, including when the
objection is based on individual opinion or attitude.
Ideological state-sponsored messages are not the only kind of compelled
speech forbidden by the First Amendment. The state similarly cannot compel facts
that the speaker would otherwise refuse to disclose. In Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., the Court recognized that “for First
Amendment purposes, a distinction cannot be drawn between compelled statements
of opinion and, as here, compelled statements of fact, since either form of
compulsion burdens protected speech.”155 In Riley, the Court focused less on the
form of the compulsion, and more on the effect or burden that it imposed on free
speech.156
To summarize, regardless of whether the compelled speech involves a statesponsored ideological message, or compelled statements of fact, the Supreme Court
has recognized an infringement on the First Amendment right of self-determination
to be free from speaking or displaying a message contrary to an individual’s
morals, opinions, or attitude. Such an infringement has traditionally required a
strict scrutiny analysis. Regardless of whether courts interpret the mandatory
speech and display requirement as reflecting the state’s ideological message of
preference for childbirth over abortion, or simply truthful, relevant, and nonmisleading facts, the distinction is extraneous when considering the infringement
on the woman’s right to be free from compelled speech.
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Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
Id.
152 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.
153 See id. at 630.
154 Id.
155 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 782 (1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
156 See id.
151
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b. Protecting the Full Expression
The nature of the compelled speech inherent in mandatory ultrasounds with
speech and display requirements is unprecedented in that a woman’s body is
integral to the production process of the state’s specific message. But for her
complicity and the use of her body, the ultrasound images could not be produced.
Even if the woman’s role is characterized as smaller than that of the physician who
is actually required to speak out loud, Supreme Court precedent has found that the
entire expression is protected by the First Amendment, including the various stages
and elements of its production.
Notably in Riley, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a state statute that
required a charitable organization to publish certain spending information to their
donors.157 Although the case dealt primarily with the level of scrutiny to apply in
cases where the regulated speech was both commercial and private in nature, the
Court made an important assertion regarding how to analyze multifaceted speech:
Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled
statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect
of the compelled statement thereon. . . . Thus, where, as here, the
component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we cannot
parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to
another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impractical.
Therefore, we apply our test for fully protected expression. 158

When commercial speech is thus “inextricably intertwined” with another form of
protected speech, the “mandated speech is subject to the test for fully protected
expression.”159 When scrutinizing compelled speech, the Court does not analyze
every element of the expression piecemeal, but rather looks to the speech taken as a
whole and its effect.160
The woman’s position in the production of the state’s message is unique, but
not an entirely foreign concept to the Supreme Court. The Court has often
analyzed the stages and elements of production when determining the existence of a
First Amendment violation. For example, in Turner Broadcasting System Inc., v.
F.C.C., the Court held that those who “engage in and transmit speech . . . are
entitled to the protection of speech and press provisions of the First Amendment. 161
Turner recognized that “the Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech
bearing a particular message are subject to the same rigorous scrutiny.”162

157
158
159
160
161
162

Id. at 784.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 782.
See id.
Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994).
Id. at 642.
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Similarly, in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Group of
Boston the Court overturned a state court decision that required a private council of
parade organizers to admit the Gay Lesbian Bisexual Group of Boston into the
procession on the grounds that denying the Group access violated a Massachusetts
law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of
public accommodation.163 The Court held that private organizers of an “expressive
parade” are entitled to First Amendment protection in the selection and
organization process of the parade.164 Specifically, the Court noted that “a private
speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious
voices . . . [n]or, under our precedent, does First Amendment protection require a
speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the
communication.”165
In like manner, the components of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 that the Lakey and
Stuart petitioners argue violate the First Amendment by compelling the physician’s
speech also violate the free speech rights of the woman. She is an essential
component in the production process, a vital element in the creation of the state’s
mandated expression.
Assuming arguendo that Casey exempted mandatory abortion disclosures by
physicians from strict scrutiny in the same way the Court exempted commercial
speech, when considering the compelled speech of the woman, as well as that of
the physician, the Court should apply protection for the complete expression. As
the Court highlighted in Casey, the “doctor-patient relation is derivative of the
woman’s position,” therefore, the priority in consideration should be from her
perspective.166 The ultrasound procedure required by H.B. 854 and H.B. 15
depicts an image taken of the woman’s body, and the woman is compelled to allow
her body to be used in the production of the image. The resultant image is then
displayed to her in real time, and the physician is then required to interpret it to her
in the manner prescribed by the state. The various elements and aspects involved
in the production of the message cannot be parceled out, with intermediate scrutiny
applying to one and strict to another. As a whole, the expression must be protected.
2. Captive Audiences and Unwilling Listeners, the Right to Not Know
The second manner in which the mandatory ultrasound requirements differ
from all prior, accepted forms of informed consent statutes is that the woman is
required to participate in the process, instead of merely being presented with the

163 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995)
(referencing MASS. GEN. LAWS § 272:98 (1992)).
164 Id. at 569.
165 Id. at 569–70.
166 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992) (finding that an informed
consent requirement did not infringe on the right to privacy between the woman and the physician
because the physician’s rights in that context were derivative of the woman’s position).
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opportunity to receive the information. This type of mandated disclosure infringes
on the rights of an unwilling listener under the captive audience doctrine. When
considering First Amendment protection, the unwilling listener/captive audience
doctrine necessarily collides with the right to speak, and has therefore been more
narrowly applied. However, when the clash is between a private individual’s right
to be free from unwanted speech and the speaker is the government, the
government enjoys no First Amendment protection.167 Therefore, I argue that in
the context of mandatory abortion disclosures, the government’s right to convey a
message does not trump the listener’s right to avoid unwanted speech.
The unwilling listener doctrine includes more variables than a free speech
analysis, which typically is subjected to a simple strict scrutiny test. The right of
the unwilling listener, however, must be balanced against the protected freedom of
speech in carefully crafted terms so as not to condone censorship of unpopular
ideas.168 This balancing of interests is captured in the captive audience
doctrine.169 As the Supreme Court established in Cohen v. California, “[t]he
ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely
to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner.”170 In determining where to draw the line between the rights of the
listener and the rights of the speaker, the courts consider whether the audience is
captive and therefore unable to avoid the speech. 171 “[T]he First Amendment does
not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the ‘captive’
audience cannot avoid [the] objectionable speech . . . [or] should not have to quit
the space to avoid the message.”172 The Court has expressly recognized this right
in the home, on public transportation buses,173 and while entering or exiting
medical facilities.174
In the case of Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court recognized the
fundamental right to be left alone as “the most comprehensive of rights and the

167 Sherry F. Colb, Some Reflections on the Texas Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Law, a Year After Its
Passage, Part 2, JUSTICIA (Jun. 6, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/06/some-reflections-on-thetexas-pre-abortion-ultrasound-law-a-year-after-its-passage-2.
168 See generally Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 55 (1988)); but see Heffron v. Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981) (holding that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at
all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”).
169 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
170 Id.
171 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
172 Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 939, 944 (2009) (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,447 U.S. 530, 541-42
(1980); also citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487).
173 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300 (1974) (finding that “the streetcar
audience is a captive audience . . . [being there] is there as a matter of necessity, not of choice.”).
174 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000)
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right most valued by civilized men.”175 In upholding the Colorado statute
prohibiting unwanted speech within 100 feet of a medical facility, the Supreme
Court held that the unwilling listener’s “right to be left alone is most applicable in
the home, but can also be protected in confrontational settings . . . [t]hus, this
comment on the right to free passage in going to and from work applies equally—
or perhaps with greater force—to access to a medical facility.”176
Similarly, women in both Texas and North Carolina are subjected to
unwanted, anti-abortion speech within a medical facility, during an intimate exam
that they are unable to refuse if they seek an abortion. As Roe established, women
have a right to an abortion, and therefore, should not be required to quit the space
to avoid the unwanted speech in the exercise of that right. The woman both cannot
avoid the speech if she is to have an abortion, and should not be required to,
because the right to an abortion is constitutionally protected.
In Lehman, the Court recognized that passengers on public buses were a
captive audience because of the need that compels them to use public transit. 177
Similarly, many women facing an abortion do so out of environmental, medical,
and economic reasons beyond their control. This paper does not attempt to analyze
the legitimacy of every woman’s reason to abort a pregnancy; however, I would
suggest that if the Court has accepted the necessity of passengers on public transit
(due to economic situation, need to travel to and from work or school), then the
many reasons offered by women seeking an abortion also constitute necessity. 178
As one scholar has noted, “they are captive to their medical condition.” 179
The fact that the state is the one imposing the message on the woman does
not negatively distinguish Hill, as the district court held in Lakey I, but rather
highlights that when the government is the one imposing the message, it should be
subject to stricter scrutiny. Even if Casey carved out an exception to physicians’
speech in relation to abortion and informed consent, it was a narrow exception: “[i]f
the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and
not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”180 This narrow exception
applied only to the compelled speech concerns of the physician, when merely
offering information that the woman could refuse. Likewise, as noted by the court
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Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Id.
177 Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302.
178 A 2004 statistical analysis by the Guttmacher Institute revealed that women seek abortions
primarily for the following reasons: (1) Inability to cope with the dramatic life change, such as an
interference in education, employment, or because the mother is already caring for other children, (2)
inability to afford to care for the child, (3) relationship problems and fears of single motherhood, (4)
already completed childrearing, and (5) health concerns. See Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons US
Women Have Abortions, Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, GUTTMACHER INST., PERSPECTIVES
SEXUAL
AND
REPROD.
HEALTH
Vol.
37(3)
(Sept.
2005),
available
at
OF
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3711005.html.
179 Corbin, supra note 172, at 1002.
180 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
176
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in Hill, “while speakers have a right to try and persuade others, ‘listeners have a
right to be free from persistent importunity, following and dogging after an offer to
communicate has been declined.’”181
Women subject to mandatory ultrasound requirements meet the elements of a
captive audience and deserve protection from unwanted speech. Both H.B. 15 and
H.B. 854 exceed the parameters set forth by Casey by requiring the woman to
receive the information, even if she declines the offer to communicate. Personal
necessity drove the woman to elect an abortion, which she pursued in the privacy of
the relationship between doctor and patient. H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 invade that
relationship, and mandate an intimate and personal procedure regardless of the
woman’s objection. Although H.B. 15 exempts some women from various
provisions of the mandated disclosures, even a victim of rape or incest or a woman
whose fetus has a devastating abnormality must submit to the ultrasound
procedure.182 The North Carolina statute offers no such exceptions. Also, even
though H.B. 854 allows a woman to put on blinders and plug her ears to avoid
hearing the description or seeing the images, her body is nevertheless compelled to
participate in the unwanted production.183 The reality is that the woman is placed
into gynecological stirrups, often given a transvaginal exam, and is required to stay
until the physician is finished delivering the state sponsored speech. The
government enjoys no constitutionally protected freedom of speech, therefore,
under the captive audience doctrine, the woman’s right as an unwilling listener
must trump the right of the state to impose the message unless the state regulation
satisfies strict scrutiny.
B. The Mandatory Ultrasound Statutes Fail Under a Strict Scrutiny Analysis.
Mandatory ultrasound regulations that carry speech and display requirements
do not satisfy strict scrutiny because they fail to promote a compelling government
interest, nor are they narrowly tailored. The Court in Roe first articulated the
government’s “important” interests in regulating abortion as “safeguarding health,
in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.” 184 These
interests became “compelling” at various points in a woman’s pregnancy according
to the trimester framework.185 Roe’s holding was later modified in Casey, in
which the Court held that the state’s “legitimate” interest in protecting the health of
the woman and the life of the fetus begins at conception and endures throughout the
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Corbin, supra note 172, at 946 (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 717-18).
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §171.003(3) (West 2012).
183 See Loomis 2014 WL 186310 at *3.
184 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
185 Id. at 162-63 (finding that the state’s interest in maternal health is compelling at the end of the
first trimester, and the interest in the life of the fetus becomes compelling at the point of viability).
182
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pregnancy.186 Casey maintained Roe’s holding that the state’s interest in
protecting fetal life becomes “compelling” post-viability.187
In Stuart v. Huff, the defendants asserted that H.B. 854 furthered the
legitimate state interests of protecting women from potential psychological harm as
a result of not being fully informed, reducing the possibility that women are
“coerced” into abortions, and promoting childbirth over abortion.188 The
defendants in Lakey I & II did not articulate the compelling government interest,
but instead relied on Casey to exempt them from defending the statute from a strict
scrutiny attack.189 Even if the state succeeded in articulating a compelling interest
related to maternal health (including psychological factors), maintaining medical
standards, protecting against coercion, and protecting fetal life, both H.B. 15 and
H.B. 854 are not narrowly tailored to meet the alleged legitimate ends.
State-mandated “content based [speech] regulations are presumptively
invalid,”190 and “[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its
content will ever be permissible.”191 Indeed, “[t]he law is not free to interfere with
speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.” 192
In establishing whether a limitation on the First Amendment is narrowly tailored to
achieve the government’s compelling interest, the government “must present more
than anecdote and supposition.” Specifically, in U.S. v. Playboy, the government
argued that the least restrictive means of addressing a legitimate problem was
inadequate, however there was insufficient evidence on the record to support the
governments claims that the prior, less restrictive remedy, had failed to narrowly
meet the government’s needs. The Court noted that the government “has failed to
establish a pervasive, nationwide problem justifying its nationwide daytime speech
ban.193 Drawing from this conclusion, the government must demonstrate that
existing regulations are insufficient to meet the government’s compelling interests,
a requirement that both North Carolina and Texas have failed to do.
First, although Casey established that the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting fetal life, that interest does not become compelling until after fetal
viability.194 Both H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 apply to all abortion procedures, the
overwhelming majority of which occur pre-viability.195 The state’s interest in
186

Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.
Id. at 846.
188 Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
189 Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey (Lakey I), 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 969
(W.D. Tex. 2011).
190 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
191 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
192 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995).
193 Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 823.
194 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); see also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
195 See Karen Pazol et al., Abortion Surveillance, United States 2009, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
187
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promoting fetal life does not supersede the First Amendment rights of the woman
until after viability, therefore, both H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 are unconstitutionally
over-broad and cannot survive a strict scrutiny on this front.
Second, the mandatory ultrasound and accompanying description do not
further the legitimate state interests in promoting maternal health, including her
psychological health. From the legislative histories of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854, it is
clear that the intent of lawmakers was to humanize the fetus, causing the woman to
connect with the images of her baby. 196 The stated goal was to fully inform
women of the consequences of choosing an abortion, namely terminating the life of
her potential child, lest she discover later with devastating psychological
consequences the full impact of her choice. Lawmakers, however, offer no
concrete support of this allegation save anecdotal testimony and reliance on
language from Carhart, where the Supreme Court specifically noted a lack of
evidence on the record pointing to the instance of psychological consequences for
the woman.197 Instead, the American Psychological Association has conducted
extensive research and concluded that there is no per se correlation between
abortion and resultant psychological problems. 198 H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 do not
promote psychological health, but instead serve to undermine it by suggesting to a
woman that her choice will destroy the life of her child.199 In essence, “[f]orcing
an ultrasound on a woman as a psychological weapon to discourage her from
having an abortion could lead to more psychological trauma.” 200 By undermining
the stated goal of protecting women from psychological harm, the mandatory

&
PREVENTION,
(Nov.
23,
2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6108a1.htm?s_cid=ss6108a1_w (noting that only
1.3% of abortions occur post viability).
196 See Andrew Kaspar, Senate Panel to Consider Abortion Law Requiring Women to View
Sonograms, STATESMAN (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional-govtpolitics/senate-panel-to-consider-abortion-law-requiring-wo/nRXNK/ (highlighting that the author of
H.B. 15, Texas Senator Dan Patrick called the bill an “emergency issue”, and if the bill would cause one
in five women to choose adoption over abortion because she viewed her baby, then 16,000 lives would
be saved).
197 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”).
198 See generally BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH
AND
ABORTION,
AM.
PSYCHOL.
ASS’N
(2008),
available
at
http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf.
199 See Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds As the Newest Tactic
in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REV. 359, 369 (2009) (“A woman who views the ultrasound
images and listens to her physician explain that the fetus has a heartbeat, limbs, and is approximately x
weeks of age, may begin to regard the fetus as a baby. However, because of various factors, the woman
proceeds with the abortion. In this scenario, it is probable that a woman viewing the fetus as a ‘baby’
would experience more psychological harm after the abortion than if she had not viewed the
ultrasound.”).
200 See id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (noting that childbirth and motherhood
in the context of unwanted pregnancy also carries the risk of “imminent” psychological harm stemming
from taxed “mental and physical health,” the distress on an unwanted child, and the sigma of unwed
motherhood).

SMITH_FORMATTE (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

5/1/2014 9:49 AM

MANDATORY ULTRASOUND STATUTES

883

ultrasound and speech and display requirements of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 fail to
further the state’s interest in promoting maternal health.
Third, H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 go beyond the state’s interest in regulating the
medical profession by exceeding the traditionally acceptable scope of stateinfluenced abortion informed consent provisions deemed constitutional by Casey.
Again, it is important to highlight that the informed consent provisions in Casey
involved making information available to women regarding alternatives to
abortion, fetal development, state preference for childbirth, and possible health
consequences.201 The Pennsylvania statute also contained an exception to the
mandated informed consent if the physician could demonstrate “by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed that furnishing
the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or
mental health of the patient.”202 Prior to the passage of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854, both
Texas and North Carolina already had informed consent provisions in place that did
not run afoul of the parameters established by Casey. Additionally, by requiring
physicians to offer patients state-created materials regarding abortion, both Texas
and North Carolina sufficiently guarded against the risk that physicians would fail
to disclose pertinent information regarding abortions to the patient. The increased
requirements of H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 that allegedly aim to combat coercion and
physician misrepresentation were enacted without any evidentiary records
demonstrating that the prior informed consent regulations failed to achieve this
purpose in such a manner that prompted further action by the state. 203 A state
regulation requiring the physicians to make available state-sponsored materials,
with the woman’s option of refusal, would meet the state’s goal through the least
restrictive means. Because H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 exceed this boundary without
any evidence that the increased regulation was necessary, the state fails to
demonstrate that the regulations were narrowly tailored.
In sum, regardless of what compelling interest is offered by the state to
justify mandatory ultrasound regulations with speech and display requirements,
these interests are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the state’s alleged
legitimate aims. Therefore, both H.B. 15 and H.B. 854 fail under a strict scrutiny
analysis in light of the First Amendment rights of the woman whose body is being
used to produce the state’s message.
CONCLUSION
Although abortion is first and foremost a woman’s issue, the evolving
jurisprudence surrounding mandatory ultrasound regulations has placed the woman

201

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1990)).
203 See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (noting that there was no evidence
on the record that the increased informed consent provisions of H.B. 854 reduced coercion).
202
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in the background, watching from a distance as the physician and the state grapple
over conflicting interests. Especially striking in the recent decisions of Lakey I & II
and Stuart is how the woman’s involvement in such an intimate procedure can be
overshadowed so as to not even warrant mention in the legal arguments. The
woman’s body is quite literally being transformed into an interactive, statesponsored message with the underlying purpose of promoting childbirth over
abortion. Even more, the woman is forced into producing this message whether or
not she consents to the procedure. In states like Texas, and perhaps soon North
Carolina, the mandatory ultrasound is a prerequisite for a woman who seeks to
have an abortion. If she desires to follow through with the abortion, she must first
have the ultrasound. Forced complicity in producing a state-sponsored message
strikes at the very core of the First Amendment and the interests against compelled
speech it was designed to protect. Similarly, courts err in ignoring the
constitutional captive audience and unwilling listener concerns of women who are
forced to hear verbal descriptions of their fetuses, regardless of their objection. As
such, the woman’s First Amendment protection against compelled speech, and
against being forced to be an unwilling listener, must become part of the
constitutional analysis of the validity of mandatory ultrasound regulations that
include speech and display requirements.

